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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Fredrick Anthony Tank appeals from the district court's decision affirming 
the magistrate's judgment of conviction entered upon the jury verdict finding 
Tank guilty of second degree stalking. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Cheree Kloepfer was married to Tank. (Tr., p. 65, L. 6 - p. 66, L. 18.1) 
They were together approximately six and a half years. (Id.) Things were not 
good between Ms. Klopefer and Tank. (Tr., p. 114, L. 25- p. 115, L. 10.) Tank 
was verbally abusive. (Id.) Ms. Kloepfer was afraid of Tank. (Tr., p. 115, Ls. 20-
22.) Ms. Kloepfer left Tank on April 24, 2014. (Tr., p. 66, L. 24 - p. 67, L. 5.) 
She had been planning on leaving him for months. (Tr., p. 67, Ls. 6-14.) She 
was "trying to keep it as low-key as possible." (Tr., p. 67, L. 23 - p. 68, L. 4.) 
Ms. Kloepfer worked at Idaho Power. (Tr., p. 84, Ls. 23-25.) On May 3, 
2014, Ms. Kloepfer checked an email account that she shared with Tank. (Tr., p. 
68, L. 15 - p. 69, L. 9.) She found that a Craigslist ad had been posted on April 
28th from that email account. (Id.) The Craigslist ad said: 
cheree at idaho power - w4m 
Greg c you deserve her. She has slept with several of the 
employees there. She has been with dozens of men in the last few 
years. She was even treating for an infection just last week. You 
may have caught something 
1 Unless otherwise indicated all transcript citations refer to the November 6, 2014 
trial transcript. 
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(Id.; Ex. 1 (verbatim).) Only Tank and Ms. Kloepfer had access to that email 
account. (Tr., p. 70, L. 9 - p. 71, L. ) Ms. Kloepfer testified that she never 
posted the ad and Tank was the only person who could have posted it. (Id.) 
Tank also knew that Ms. Kloepfer had a yeast infection. (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 5-14.) 
A few days later, on May 9th, Ms. Kloepfer received an email from Tank, 
titled, "Trying to make you feel guilty." (Tr., p. 81, L. 23 - p. 83, L. 8; Ex. 4.) The 
body of the email read: 
I dont think its fair john knows where you live and what you are 
doing and you dont even live him. You love me and I cant even call 
or text. How can I ever woo you or date you? 
(Ex. 4 (verbatim).) The "John" referenced in Tank's email was Ms. Kloepfer's 
first husband and father of her five children. (Tr., p. 83, Ls. 7-13.) Tank sent two 
more emails that day. (Tr., p. 95, L. 6 - p. 97, L. 24; Exs. 10, 11.) One was 
titled, "I know you are getting these" and in the body said, "Why won't you 
respond?" (Ex. 10.) The next email was sent at 11 :00 p.m. and titled, "After all I 
have done for you." (Ex. 11.) 
About fifteen minutes after that email was sent, as Ms. Kloepfer was 
getting ready for bed, she started receiving several text messages on her phone. 
(Tr., p. 72, L. 15 - p. 74, L. 1, p. 97, L. 22 - p. 98, L. 8; Ex. 2.) Ms. Kloepfer did 
not recognize the numbers. (Id.) One of the texts said, "Hey, I've seen your 
craigslist post." (Tr., p. 74, Ls. 9-14.) She had not posted any ad on Craigslist. 
(Tr., p. 74, Ls. 15-16.) 
Right away Ms. Kloepfer looked on Craigslist and found an ad saying that 
she "love[d] to give head." (Tr., p. 74, p. 17 - p. 75, L. 21.) The ad listed her 
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name, phone number and where she worked. (Id.; Ex. 3.) Ms. Kloepfer had to 
immediately change her phone number to avoid the anonymous callers. (Tr., p. 
76, Ls. 12-18.) Tank was the only person who Ms. Kloepfer thought would have 
posted that ad. (Tr., p. 77, Ls. 3-9.) She was unaware of anyone else who was 
upset with her. (Id.) 
The next day, Tank sent Ms. Kloepfer another email. (Tr., p. 85, L. 20 -
p. 86, L. 14; Ex. 5.) The email was sent at 4:34 a.m. and said: 
Since you won't communicate with me I just had a brilliant idea. Of 
course it was 430 am. I am going to get a banner that says I love 
you and sit out in front of Idaho power on Monday mid day. Every 
one coming in and out is going to see it and me. 
(Ex. 5 (verbatim).) A couple of hours later, Tank sent another email. (Tr., p. 86, 
L. 24 - p. 88, L. 17; Ex. 6.) 
I know you think I'm bluffing. But every time I pray about this 
everything tells me to fight for you. That you are worth it. In the past 
no one ever fought for you. They just let You go. When I married 
you I swore I would never do that. I woke up after praying 
massively and had the very distinct thought that to communicate I 
should sit with a big sign or banner. At the big main entrance that's 
says I love you. I will be there from 1130am to 1 pm. 
Remember how when Connie and your first lawyer said I should go 
away. Get out of the picture. That would be best. Well if I had done 
that I wouldn't have had almost seven years with you. 
I would love to talk but come monday I will communicate. Loi 
(Ex. 6 (verbatim).) This made Ms. Kloepfer feel edgy and fearful that Tank would 
actually do something to cause her problems and embarrassment at work. (Tr., 
p. 89, Ls. 4-7.) 
Tank continued to send emails the morning of May 10th. (Tr., p. 89, L. 8 
- p. 94, L. 2.) In one of the emails, with the subject line, "Ill have a message for 
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Greg too," Tank explained he'll have a sign telling Greg to stay away from Ms. 
Kloepfer. (Ex. 7) Greg was one of Ms. Kloepfer's male coworkers with whom 
she had become friends. (Tr., p. 90, Ls. 5-13.) Tank sent another email with the 
subject line, "Don't worry." (Ex. 8.) Tank wrote: 
Its all legal. Ill be like those union guys that as long as I stay in a 
public place and don't come on the property I'm ok. Is Idaho power 
still trying to keep that place a secret? Hmm. They are going to 
love me. 
(Ex. 8 (verbatim).) The next day Tank sent Ms. Kloepfer yet another email. (Tr., 
p. 93, L. 10 - p. 94, L. 2.) 
I won't be outside your work tomorrow I was going to have a 
banner that said I love you. I was told at church today that your job 
is being held by a thread. That's the second time I was told that in 
five days. 
(Ex. 9 (verbatim).) Ms. Kloepfer understood this email to be "[a] threat to [her] 
job." (Tr., p. 93, L. 10 - p. 94, L. 2.) 
The next day, May 12th, while Ms. Kloepfer was driving home from work, 
she looked in her rearview mirror and saw Tank's car. (Tr., p. 77, L. 10 - p. 78, 
L. 19.) She knew it was Tank because she recognized his gold Kia, and when 
they slowed down at a stoplight, she could actually see him in her review mirror. 
(Tr., p. 79, Ls. 4-24.) Tank had purchased an Arizona license plate at a yard 
sale that said "Tank" and Ms. Kloepfer could see this license plate in the back 
window of the gold Kia. (Id.) Ms. Kloepfer was on the phone with her dad, and 
her dad told her to meet him at Settler's Park. (Tr., p. 77, L. 10 - p. 78, L. 19.) 
Ms. Kloepfer got into a lane to turn onto Meridian Road and Tank pulled 
up next to her. (Tr., p. 79, L. 25 - p. 80, L. 23.) She was in a turn lane, and 
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Tank was in a lane that went straight. (Id.) She thought Tank was going to go 
straight and leave her alone, but after she turned, he changed lanes and turned 
and followed her. (Id.) 
When Ms. Kloepfer headed to the park she called the police. (Tr., p. 77, 
L. 10 - p. 78, L. 19.) Dispatch told her that they could have a police car meet 
her at Settler's Park. (Tr., p. 79, L. 25 - p. 80, L. 14.) When Ms. Kloepfer got to 
the park she saw Tank drive by the park and drive through the parking lot. (Tr., 
p. 80, L. 24 - p. 81, L. 10.) Tank did not know where Ms. Kloepfer was staying, 
and she was concerned he was following her in order to figure out where she 
was staying. (Tr., p. 81, Ls. 17-22.) 
A few days later, on May 14th, Ms. Kloepfer was at work at Idaho Power. 
(Tr., p. 98, Ls. 16-22.) Ms. Kloepfer saw Tank across the street holding signs. 
(Tr., p. 99, L. 18 - p. 100, L. 22.) The signs said "Cheree Tank I Love You" and 
"Greg Chapel [stay away from my] wife." (Tr., p. 101, L. 25 - p. 102, L. 5; Ex. 
12.) All of Ms. Kloepfer's coworkers saw the signs and asked her about it. (Tr., 
p. 102, Ls. 17-25.) The Idaho Power security guard called the police. (Tr., p. 
103, Ls. 6-16.) 
Two days later, on May 16th, Ms. Kloepfer's father received an 
anonymous text with a picture attached depicting a naked Ms. Kloepfer tied up in 
bed "giving head to somebody." (Tr., p. 103, L. 25 - p. 105, L. 3.) The text said, 
"This is you and [Ms. Kloepfer]." (Tr., p. 119, L. 25 - p. 120, L. 4.) The picture 
was a picture taken by Tank. (Tr., p. 105, Ls. 4-5.) Tank had Ms. Kloepfer's 
father's phone number. (Tr., p. 116, Ls. 8-9.) The text message was from an 
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internet service that allows users to send anonymous texts. (Tr., p. 119, Ls. 10-
21.) 
The state charged Tank with misdemeanor stalking in the second degree, 
a violation of Idaho Code § 18-7906. (R., pp. 7-8, 100-101.) At trial, Ms. 
Kloepfer's father, Hank, testified that on May 12th, he was at Settler's Park when 
he received a panicked phone call from his daughter that Tank was following her. 
(Tr., p. 116, L. 21 - p. 118, L. 9.) Hank told her to drive to the park and call 911. 
(Id.) Hank stood in the parking lot and saw Ms. Kloepfer drive into the park; and 
then he saw Tank's car pull into the parking lot, and drive through the parking lot, 
before leaving. (Id.) 
Tank testified in his own defense. Tank testified that he was surprised 
when Ms. Kloepfer left him. (Tr., p. 125, L. 15 - p. 126, L. 22.) Tank denied that 
he posted any Craigslist ads for Ms. Kloepfer. (Tr., p. 128, Ls. 2-11.) Tank also 
denied that he followed Ms. Kloepfer to the park on May 12th. (Tr., p. 129, L. 14 
- p. 130, L. 10.) Tank claimed he was filling his car up with gas at the Paul's 
Market gas station at the time. (Tr., p. 130, Ls. 5-7, p. 146, Ls. 19-25.) Tank 
admitted that he posted the signs outside of Ms. Kloepfer's workplace on May 
14th. (Tr., p. 132, L. 18 - p. 133, L. 19.) But he denied that he sent the sexually 
explicit picture to Ms. Kloepfer's father. (Tr., p. 133, Ls. 20-23.) Tank testified 
that he thought Ms. Kloepfer "had some serious emotional and mental problems" 
and that she may have had a "mental breakdown" when she left him. (Tr., p. 
1 36, L. 13 - p. 1 3 7, L. 7.) 
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In rebuttal, the state called Officer Fuller, who testified that at 6:55 p.m. on 
May 12th, dispatch received a call from Ms. Kloepfer who reported that Tank was 
following her to Settler's Park. (Tr., p. 156, L. 20 - p. 157, L. 25; Ex. 13.) Officer 
Fuller testified that it takes approximately 17 to 23 minutes to drive to Paul's 
Market gas station from Settler's Park. (Tr., p. 160, L. 19 - p. 162, L. 12.) The 
state also introduced a receipt from Paul's Market gas station that Tank claimed 
showed he had an alibi for May 12th. (Tr., p. 166, L. 5 - p. 167, L. 7; Ex. 14.) 
The receipt had a time stamp of 7:20 p.m., which gave Tank enough time to get 
from Settler's Park to the gas station. (See Ex. 14.) 
The jury found Tank guilty of stalking in the second degree. (R., p. 99.) 
The magistrate sentenced Tank to two years' supervised probation, but held that 
once he completed any treatment or classes the probation officer felt necessary 
he could petition the court to release him from supervised probation. (Tr., p. 211, 
L. 1 - p. 212, L. 19.) The magistrate also ordered that Tank have no contact 
with Ms. Kloepfer for the term of his probation. (Id.) 
Tank moved for a Rule 35 reconsideration of the sentence. (R., pp. 103-
104.) Tank argued that he could not afford to comply with the sentence imposed 
and claimed that he did not have an alcohol or drug problem. (Id.) The state 
objected and argued, in part, that the sentence was not excessive because Tank 
was subsequently convicted of two counts of Violation of a Protection Order 
against the same victim. (R., pp. 105-107.) The magistrate denied Tank's 
motion to reconsider his sentence. (R., p. 120.) 
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Tank timely appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 108-110.) On appeal 
Tank argued that his sentence was excessive and claimed the state's evidence 
was insufficient to convict him of stalking in the second degree. (R., pp. 132-
141.) The district court affirmed. (R., pp. 164-180.) 
Tank timely appealed the decision of the district court. (R., pp. 181-183.) 
After he filed his appeal, Tank moved the district court to reconsider based upon 
the United States Supreme Court holding in Elonis v. United States, _ U.S._, 
135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015). (R., pp. 184-185.) The district court initially granted the 
motion for reconsideration, but ultimately held it lacked the authority to hear 
Tank's motion for reconsideration. (R., pp. 204-206.) 
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ISSUES 
Tank states the issues on appeal as: 
I. Was the State's evidence insufficient to support a 
reasonable inference that Mr. Tank committed stalking in the 
second degree? 
II. Was the Magistrate Court's Jury Instruction, Requiring Only 
Negligence With Respect to the Stalking Course of Conduct 
Sufficient to Support a Conviction Pursuant to Idaho Code Section 
18-7906? 
Ill. Should the Appellate Court Reverse the Unobjected-to Error 
When the Error Violated One or More of Mr. Tank's Unwaived 
Constitutional Rights, Was Obvious, and Affected the Outcome of 
the Trial Proceedings? 
IV. Did the Magistrate Court Abuse its Discretion When it 
Denied Mr. Tank's Rule 35 Motion Requesting Unsupervised 
Probation in Light of Mr. Tank's Current Financial Situation, As Well 
As This Being His First Offense for a Crime? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Tank failed to show the district court erred when it found there 
was substantial and competent evidence to support the jury's guilty verdict? 
2. Did Tank waive his instructional error claim by failing to raise it 
either in the trial court or on intermediate appeal? 
3. Has Tank failed to show that the district court erred in holding that 
the magistrate did not abuse its discretion when it denied Tank's Rule 35 
Motion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The State Presented Sufficient Evidence From Which The Jury Could Conclude, 
Beyond A Reasonable Doubt, That Tank Committed Stalking In The Second 
Degree 
A. Introduction 
Tank argues that the state did not present sufficient evidence to support 
Tank's conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 6-7.) Specifically, Tank argues that his 
act of posting signs outside of Ms. Kloepfer's workplace was a constitutionally 
protected activity and there was no evidence linking him to the explicit Craigslist 
advertisements, no evidence that he followed Ms. Kloepfer to the park, and no 
evidence linking him to the sexually explicit text sent to Ms. Kloepfer's father. 
(Id.) 
The district court rejected these same arguments. (R., pp. 136-138, 166-
176.) The district court held that, even if his actions outside of Ms. Kloepfer's 
workplace were constitutionally protected and omitted, there still was sufficient 
evidence to convict Tank. (R., p. 174.) The district court also determined that 
there was evidence that Tank followed Ms. Kloepfer to the park and sufficient 
circumstantial evidence to conclude both that Tank sent the explicit sexual photo 
to Ms. Kloepfer's father and that he posted the explicit Craigslist advertisements. 
(R., p. 176.) On appeal, Tank has failed to articulate any error made by the 
district court. 
10 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing the decision of a district court sitting in its appellate 
capacity, the Idaho appellate courts directly review the district court's decision. 
State v. Loomis, 146 Idaho 700, 702, 201 P.3d 1277, 1279 (2009). The 
appellate courts are procedurally bound to affirm or reverse the decision of the 
district court. State v. Trusdall, 155 Idaho 965, 968, 318 P.3d 955, 958 (Ct. App. 
2014). 
"Appellate review of the sufficiency of evidence is limited in scope." State 
v. Marsh, 153 Idaho 360, 365, 283 P.3d 107, 112 (Ct. App. 2011 ). An appellate 
court will not set aside a judgment of conviction entered upon a jury verdict if 
there is substantial evidence upon which a rational trier of fact could have found 
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Miller, 
131 Idaho 288, 292, 955 P.2d 603, 607 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Reyes, 121 
Idaho 570, 826 P.2d 919 (Ct. App. 1992). In conducting this review the appellate 
court will not substitute its view for that of the jury as to the credibility of 
witnesses, the weight to be given to the testimony, or the reasonable inferences 
to be drawn from the evidence. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State 
v. Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991). Moreover, the facts, 
and inferences to be drawn from those facts, are construed in favor of upholding 
the jury's verdict. Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. Hart, 112 
Idaho 759, 761, 735 P.2d 1070, 1072 (Ct. App. 1987). 
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C. Tank Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Determined 
There Was Sufficient Evidence To Support Tank's Conviction For Second 
Degree Stalking 
The jury found Tank guilty of stalking in the second degree. (R., p. 99.) 
On intermediate appeal to the district court Tank argued, in part, there was 
insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction because Tank's posting of signs 
outside of Ms. Kloepfer's place of work was a constitutionally protected activity 
and there was no evidence linking him to the online postings, to following Ms. 
Kloepfer to the park, or to the sexually explicit text sent to Ms. Kloepfer's father. 
(R., pp. 136-138.) Regarding the posting of signs outside of Ms. Kloepfer's place 
of work, the district court held: 
The appellant asserts "he was engaged in constitutionally protected 
activity when he was picketing outside of the Idaho Power Call 
Center." Brief of Appellant, at 5. However, even assuming this 
was constitutionally protected activity this was not the only conduct 
the jury heard about in reference to the stalking charge. Even 
omitting this incident, sufficient evidence was presented to the jury 
from which it could have reasonably concluded that the appellant 
was guilty of the offense. 
(R., p. 174.) The district court also noted that communication made with the 
"intent to annoy, threaten, intimidate, harass or offend" is not protected speech. 
(R., p. 174 n. 13 (citing State v. Briggs, 2012 WL 9500354, *5 (Idaho Ct. App. 
2012); State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 36, 896 P.2d 357, 362 (Ct. App. 1995).) 
The district court also rejected Tank's other sufficiency of the evidence 
arguments and held: 
Finally, the appellant "argues that there is absolutely no evidence 
linking him to the Craig's List postings, nor to the allegations that he 
followed Ms. Tank to Settler's Park, nor to the sexual image and 
text message that was sent to her father." Brief of Appellant, at 7. 
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Both Ms. Kloepfer and her father testified concerning the Settler's 
Park incident, and a Meridian police officer, Jeff Fuller, testified that 
he was called to respond to the incident. See November 16, 2014 
Hearing Transcript, at 153-64. 
The evidence connecting the appellant to the Craigslist ad and the 
sending of the nude photo was circumstantial and was reasonable 
given the context of the rest of the appellant's actions and the lack 
of any other plausible explanation for who would have done this, 
apart from the appellant. See Crawford v. State, 2014 WL 
7177463, *6 (Id. Ct. App.) ("Substantial evidence may exist even 
when the evidence presented is solely circumstantial or when there 
is conflicting evidence. Even when circumstantial evidence could 
be interpreted consistent with a finding of innocence, it will be 
sufficient to uphold a guilty verdict when it also gives rise to 
reasonable inferences of guilt.") (citing State v. Severson, 147 
Idaho 694, 712, 215 P.3d 414, 432 (2009); State v. Stevens, 93 
Idaho 48, 50-51,454 P.2d 945, 947-48 (1969)). 
(R., p. 176.) On appeal, Tank reiterates the same arguments that were rejected 
by the district court. (See Appellant's brief, pp. 6-8.) 
Tank's argument that the signs posted outside Ms. Kloepfer's workplace 
were constitutionally protected free speech, and thus should not be considered 
by the appellate court, is incorrect. In determining whether there was sufficient 
evidence to sustain a conviction, the appellate court reviews all the evidence 
admitted at trial, even if that evidence was erroneously admitted. See State v. 
Moore, 148 Idaho 887, 894, 231 P.3d 532, 539 (2010) (citing Lockhart v. Nelson, 
488 U.S. 33, 40-42 (1988); 6 Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Procedure 651 (3 ed. 
2007).) 
However, the evidence of the signs was properly admitted.2 The district 
court correctly pointed out that communication with the "intent to annoy, terrify, 
2 Tank did not object to the admissibility of the signs thus did not preserve their 
admissibility as an issue for appeal. (See Tr., p. 98, L. 16- p. 102, L. 5; Ex. 12.) 
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threaten, intimidate, harass, or offend" is not protected speech. See Richards, 
127 Idaho at 36, 896 P.2d at 362. The jury found that Tank's course of conduct 
was malicious. (R., p. 99.) Tank's posting of signs outside of Ms. Kloepfer's 
workplace was not protected speech. Regardless, there was sufficient evidence 
to support a conviction even if evidence of these signs were excluded. (See R., 
p. 166-176.) 
There was substantial evidence that Tank followed Ms. Kloepfer to the 
park. Ms. Kloepfer testified she looked in her rearview mirror and saw Tank's 
car. (Tr., p. 77, L. 10 - p. 78, L. 19.) She knew it was Tank because it was a 
gold Kia, and when they slowed down at the stoplight, she could actually see him 
in her review mirror. (Tr., p. 79, Ls. 4-24.) Hank Kloepfer also testified that he 
saw Ms. Kloepfer drive into the park, and then he saw Tank's car pull into the 
parking lot, and drive through the parking lot, before finally leaving. (Tr., p. 116, 
L. 21 - p. 118, L. 9.) Further, based on the testimony of Officer Fuller, Tank had 
enough time to get from Settler's Park to the gas station, which contradicted his 
purported alibi. (Tr., p. 160, L. 19-p. 162, L.12, p.166, L. 5-p.167, L. 7; Ex. 
14.) 
There was also evidence that Tank posted the Craigslist ads and texted 
the explicit photo to Ms. Kloepfer's father. The first Craigslist ad was posted 
using an email account that only Tank and Ms. Kloepfer had access to. (Tr., p. 
70, L. 9 - p. 71, L. 7.) Ms. Kloepfer testified that she never posted the ad and 
Tank was the only person who could have posted the ad. (Id.) The second 
Craigslist ad came right on the heels of a series of emails Tank sent Ms. 
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Kioepfer, trying to get her attention. (Tr., p. 72, L. 15 - p. 7 4, L. 1, p. 95, 6 - p. 
98, 7; Exs. 2, 3, 4, 10, 11.) The second advertisement also referenced her 
place of work. (Ex. 3.) Ms. Kloepfer's father received the explicit text photo on 
May 16th, only a few days after Tank picketed Ms. Kloepfer at work and 
barraged her with emails. (Tr., p. 103, L. 25 - p. 105, L. 3.) The person sending 
the text wanted it to be anonymous because he used an internet service that 
sends out anonymous texts. (Tr., p. 119, Ls. 10-21.) Hank Kloepfer testified that 
Tank had his phone number. (Tr., p. 116, Ls. 8-9.) The explicit picture was a 
picture taken by Tank. (Tr., p. 105, Ls. 4-5.) 
On appeal, Tank is essentially asking this Court to disregard the testimony 
of Ms. Kloepfer, Hank Kloepfer and Officer Fuller. Determining credibility of 
witnesses is for the jury to decide and the appellate court will not substitute its 
view for that of the jury. See Miller, 131 Idaho at 292, 955 P.2d at 607; State v. 
Knutson, 121 Idaho 101, 822 P.2d 998 (Ct. App. 1991 ). The jury found Tank 
guilty. The district court found there was sufficient evidence to convict Tank. 
Tank has failed to show the district court erred. 
11. 
Tank Waived His Instruction Error Claim By Failing To Raise It In Trial Or On 
Intermediate Appeal And The Jury Instruction Was Not Erroneous 
A. Introduction 
Tank argues the second degree stalking jury instruction constituted 
fundamental error, because the jury instruction only required the state to prove 
Tank was negligent and did not require proof of criminal intent. (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 14-15.) Tank alleges this violated his due process rights and affected 
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the outcome of the trial. (Id.) In support of his argument Tank heavily relies on 
Elonis v. United States, _ U.S. _, 135 S.Ct. 2001 (2015). (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 8-13.) Elonis holds that a "negligence" standard is insufficient to 
establish the mental state required for conviction under a federal threat statute. 
Tank did not raise this instructional error claim before the magistrate. Nor 
did Tank raise this claim when he appealed to the district court. (R., pp. 132-
141.) After the district court affirmed Tank's conviction, Tank appealed. (R., pp. 
164-183.) Tank cannot now raise issues that are different than those presented 
to the intermediate court. 
Even if this Court addresses the merits of Tank's argument, Tank's 
reliance on Elonis is misplaced. Unlike the federal statute at issue in Elonis, the 
Idaho second degree stalking statute does not employ a "negligence" standard 
for the mental state requirement. See I.C. § 18-7906. Idaho Code 18-7906 
requires the state prove that the defendant acted "knowingly and maliciously." 
See Id. The jury instruction accurately reflected this mental state requirement. 
(R., p. 91.) There was no error, much less fundamental error. 
B. Tank Waived His Instructional Error Claim By Failing To Raise It Either In 
The Trial Court Or On Intermediate Appeal 
Tank did not object to the stalking jury instruction at trial. (Tr., p. 168, Ls. 
13-18). Tank did not raise this stalking jury instruction when he appealed to the 
district court. (R., pp. 132-141.) Accordingly, the district court's intermediate 
appellate opinion did not address this jury instruction issue. (R., pp. 164-179.) 
"[W]here a party appeals the decision of an intermediate appellate court, the 
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appellant may not raise issues that are different from those presented to the 
intermediate court." State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 275, 77 P.3d 956, 964 
(2003) (citing State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 847, 979 P.2d 1201, 1205 (1999)). 
Issues not raised in the intermediate appellate court are waived. See Jg. 
Tank's motion to reconsider did not raise this issue on intermediate 
appeal. (See R., pp. 184, 190-200.) An appellant is not permitted to raise new 
issues after the opening brief is filed. See Sims v. Jacobson, 157 Idaho 980, 
986, 342 P.3d 907, 913 (2015); see also State v. Phillips, 117 Idaho 23, 25, 784 
P.2d 353, 355 (Ct. App. 1989). Because Tank did not raise this issue in his 
opening brief before the district court, Tank did not raise this issue on 
intermediate appeal, and therefore it was waived. 
C. Tank Cannot Show The Second Degree Stalking Jury Instruction Was 
Error, Let Alone Fundamental Error 
Even if Tank did not waive this issue by failing to raise it on intermediate 
appeal, his unpreserved claim of instructional error still fails. Generally, issues 
not raised below may not be considered for the first time on appeal. State v. 
Fodge, 121 Idaho 192, 195, 824 P.2d 123, 126 (1992). However, when a 
defendant fails to object to a jury instruction, the appellate courts may still review 
the jury instruction for fundamental error. State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 472-
73, 272 P.3d 417, 444-45 (2012) (citing State v. Johnson, 145 Idaho 970, 977, 
188 P.3d 912, 919 (2008); State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 
976 (2010)). Before the appellate court can consider whether there was 
fundamental error, the appellate court must first determine whether the trial court 
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erred at all. Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 473, 272 P.3d at 445 (citing Johnson, 145 
Idaho at 977, 188 P.3d at 919). "The Perry fundamental error test requires the 
defendant to show three things: (1) the alleged error violated an unwaived 
constitutional right; (2) the alleged error plainly exists; and (3) the alleged error 
was not harmless." kl (citing Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980). 
The magistrate's jury instruction on second degree stalking accurately 
reflected the language of Idaho Code § 18-7906. (See R., p. 91.) Nonetheless, 
Tank argues that, based upon Elonis, the magistrate's jury instruction rises to 
fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-15.) Tank argues that the second 
degree stalking jury instruction only required the state prove that Tank was 
negligent, and a negligent mental state is not sufficient to support a criminal 
conviction. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-13.) Tank argues that Idaho Code § 18-
7906 "employs a negligence standard" because it requires the defendant to 
engage in a course of conduct that would cause a "reasonable person," among 
other things, "substantial emotional distress." (See Appellant's brief, p. 9. 3) 
In support of his argument, Tank relies heavily on Elonis. Elonis has no 
bearing on this case. Elonis posted multiple threats to his ex-wife, his co-
workers, a kindergarten class and to a female FBI agent on his Facebook page. 
Elonis, at _. Elonis claimed they were not true threats, but instead were rap 
lyrics. kl The government charged Elonis with a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
kl An individual is guilty under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) if he "transmits in interstate or 
3 To the extent Tank is attempting to challenge the constitutionality of Idaho 
Code§ 18-7906, that claim has not been preserved. 
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foreign commerce any communication containing any threat to kidnap any 
person or any threat to injure the person of another." lit 
18 U.S.C. § 875(c) did not specify what mental state the defendant must 
have with respect to the threat. lit Elonis requested a jury instruction that "the 
government must prove that he intended to communicate a true threat." lit The 
district court denied his request and instead gave an instruction that a "true 
threat" is one that a "reasonable person" would see as a threat. lit Elonis was 
convicted and he appealed. lit 
The United States Supreme Court determined that the instruction given by 
the district court imposed a "negligence" standard for Elonis' mental state. lit 
The Court characterized the government's argument: 
That is precisely the Government's position here: Elonis can be 
convicted, the Government contends, if he himself knew the 
contents and context of his posts, and a reasonable person would 
have recognized that the posts would be read as genuine threats. 
That is a negligence standard. 
Id. The Court explained the basic principle that "wrongdoing must be conscious 
to the criminal." lit (citation omitted). 
The "central thought" is that a defendant must be "blameworthy in 
mind" before he can be found guilty, a concept courts have 
expressed over time through various terms such as mens rea, 
scienter, malice aforethought, guilty knowledge, and the like. 
Although there are exceptions, the "general rule" is that a guilty 
mind is "a necessary element in the indictment and proof of every 
crime." 
lit (internal citations omitted). The Court reiterated the longstanding requirement 
that the state prove the defendant's mental state, and held that the mental state 
cannot be akin to a "reasonable person" test that occurs in civil liability. lit The 
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Court reversed Elonis' conviction because a "negligent" mental state was 
insufficient to convict Elonis of violating 18 U.S.C. § 875(c). 
Contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 875(c), Idaho Code § 18-7906 contains a 
"knowingly and maliciously" mental state requirement. See l.C. § 18-7906. 
A person commits the crime of stalking in the second degree if the 
person knowingly and maliciously: 
(a) Engages in a course of conduct that seriously alarms, 
annoys or harasses the victim and is such as would cause a 
reasonable person substantial emotional distress; ... 
See l.C. § 18-7906(1)(a) (emphasis added). The magistrate instructed the jury 
on the required "knowingly" and "maliciously" mental state required under Idaho 
Code§ 18-7906(1)(a). (R., p. 91; Tr., p. 170, Ls. 8-23.) 
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Stalking in the Second 
Degree, the state must prove each of the following: 
1. On or about April 24 through May 16, 2014 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. the defendant Fredrick Tank 
4. knowingly, and 
5. maliciously 
6. engaged in a course of conduct 
7. that seriously alarmed annoyed or harassed Cheree Kloepfer 
and 
8. was such as would cause a reasonable person substantial 
emotional distress. 
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt, you must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above 
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find 
the defendant guilty. 
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(R., p. 91 (emphasis added).) Contrary to the jury instructions in Elonis, which 
only required the state to prove that the defendant acted "negligently," here the 
state was required to prove that Tank acted "knowingly" and "maliciously."4 
Tank's argument does not address the "knowingly" and "maliciously" 
requirement and instead solely focuses on the element: "was such as would 
cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress." (See Appellant's 
brief, pp. 11-12.) The "reasonable person" element of Idaho Code § 18-
7906(1 )(a) is not the mental state requirement for that crime. That element does 
not impose a negligence mental state requirement; instead it describes the 
conduct of the defendant. Elonis does not stand for the proposition that a 
"reasonable person" standard cannot be used in a criminal statute, it only stands 
for the proposition that a "negligence" standard is insufficient to show the mental 
state required for a crime. The mental state required for conviction under 1.C. § 
18-7906 is "knowingly" and "maliciously." 
Tank has failed to show the magistrate's instruction regarding stalking in 
the second degree was error, let alone fundamental error. 
4 Other jurisdictions have interpreted Elonis similarly and held that where the 
state criminal statute contains a mental state element Elonis is inapplicable. See 
People v. Murillo, 238 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1129, 190 Cal. Rptr. 3d 119, 124 
(2015) (Elonis concerns the "mens rea" requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) and 
does not impact interpretation of state statute); Arevalo v. Eighth Judicial Dist. 
Court of State ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 2015 WL 4504103, at *1 (Nev. July 21, 
2015) (unpublished) (Elonis is inapplicable because the state harassment and 
breach of peace statutes contain mental state requirements). 
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111. 
Tank Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred When It Held That The 
Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Tank contends that the magistrate court abused its discretion when it 
denied his Rule 35 Motion. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-17.) Tank however did not 
support his motion with any new or additional information. Having failed to do 
so, Tank failed to show he was entitled to a Rule 35 reduction of his sentence. 
The district court correctly affirmed the denial of Tank's Rule 35 Motion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"When the district court acts in an appellate capacity on appeal from the 
magistrate division and a further appeal is taken, the higher appellate court 
reviews the record of the magistrate independently of, but with due regard for the 
district court's decision." State v. Stringer, 126 Idaho 867, 869-70, 893 P.2d 814, 
816-17 (Ct. App. 1995) (citing State v. Van Sickle, 120 Idaho 99, 101, 813 P.2d 
910, 912 (Ct. App. 1991). Denial of a Rule 35 motion is reviewed for an abuse of 
discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 202, 159 P.3d 838, 839 (2007). 
C. Tank Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred When It Held The 
Magistrate Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Denied Tank's Rule 35 
Motion To Take Him Off Supervised Probation 
The magistrate imposed a sentence within the statutory limits. Tank 
moved for a Rule 35 reconsideration of the sentence. (R., pp. 103-104.) Tank 
argued that he could afford to comply with the sentence imposed and claimed 
that he did not have an alcohol or drug problem. (Id.) The magistrate denied 
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Tank's motion to reconsider his sentence. (R., p. 120.) Tank appealed the 
denial of his Rule 35 motion to the district court. (R., pp. 139-140.) The district 
court affirmed the order denying Tank's Rule 35 motion. (R., pp. 164-180.) 
"The criteria for examining rulings denying a request for leniency under 
I.C.R. 35 are the same as those applied in determining whether the original 
sentence was reasonable." Stringer, 126 Idaho at 870, 893 P .2d at 817 
(citations omitted). If a sentence is within applicable statutory limits, a motion for 
reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this court reviews 
the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203, 
159 P.3d at 840. To prevail on appeal, Tank must "show that the sentence is 
excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the 
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion." kl If the defendant fails to make 
this showing, the appellate court cannot say that the denial of the motion 
represents an abuse of discretion. Stringer, 126 Idaho at 870, 893 P.2d at 817. 
( citation omitted). 
The district court held, in part, that Tank did not submit new evidence with 
his Rule 35 Motion. (R., p. 177.) Tank only argued "he 'cannot afford to comply 
with his sentencing recommendation' but presented no evidence in support of 
this motion." (R., p. 177 (citing Motion for Reconsideration, at 1 ).) Because 
Tank did not submit new or additional information, the denial of his Rule 35 
motion does not constitute an abuse of discretion. 
On appeal, Tank has failed to show the district court erred and failed to 
show the magistrate abused its discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
appellate decision affirming Tank's conviction for stalking in the second degree 
and affirming the denial of Tank's Rule 35 motion. 
DATED this 25th day of November, 2015. 
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